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A Negative Incentive Based Proposal for
Campaign Finance Reform: Lessons
From Nottingham

herefore, upon such as come hereabouts, I levy a
certain toll, which I use for a better purpose, I
hope, than to make candlesticks withal.
Therefore, sweet chuck, I would have thee deliver to me thy
purse, that I may look into it, and judge, to the best of my
poor powers, whether thou hast more wealth about thee
than our law allows.

'

Like the advent of taxes, summer re-runs, and visits from
in-laws, 1992~is here and another election year is upon us.3
Elections, one of the enduring wonders of American
democracy: provide each citizen a chance to participate in
g~vernment.~
Elections are also a time when candidates are
pounding the pavement searching for campaign dollars. After
all, this is America, and Yand of the free" doesn't mean
PYLE,THE MERRYADVENTURESOF ROBINHOOD101 (1952) (words
1. HOWARD
of Robin Hood to Will Gamwell).
I have never understood why we have elections in the "even" years-it
2.
seems to me that the "odd" years would make more sense. While I am on the
subject, I have never understood why elections fall on the first Tuesday after the
first Monday of November. Why not hold elections on a date with real meaning
like July 4th' or better yet, April lst?
3.
You can always recognize an election year because it's the only time your
Representative in Congress writes to you.
4.
It's a wonder that democracy can endure election year chaos.
5.
Yes, ours is a government "by the people and for the people," which has a
nice ring to it until you have witnessed the spectacle of American politics.
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candidates can get elected without some real financial backing.
Today, serious candidates6 must raise staggering amounts of
money to get elected.' During the 1988 campaign, amounts
spent by political candidates in federal elections totaled $718
m i l l i ~ n When
.~
expenditures by all political candidates and all
who attempted to influence the political process at the federal,
state, and local levels are summed together, the total cost of
. ~ where does all
the 1988 election cycle swells to $2.7 b i l l i ~ n So
this money go? My guess is that the money is spent on a
barrage of thirty second commercials, special breakfasts, and
luncheons aimed a t convincing the voting public that the
candidates need more money. This Comment takes the position
that campaign costs threaten to spiral out of control unless
each candidate can be lead to raise and spend less money. This
Comment further proposes a campaign receipts tax that would
encourage individual candidates to voluntarily control their
campaign spending sprees.

11. A GLANCEAT THE CURRENT
SYSTEM
The biggest problem with our current campaign finance
systemlo is not that candidates need a lot of money to get
"Serious candidate" is something of an oxymoron, not because candidates
6.
are not serious people, but because the public finds i t difficult to take what they
say seriously.
7.
Was that a government "by the people" or "buy the people?"
8.
DAVID B. MAGLEBY& CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE:
CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGN
FINANCEREFORM28-33 (1990). It is interesting to note
that in 1988, winning House candidates spent a n average of $388,000 and
successful Senate candidates spent a n average of $3,745,000. Id. at 36. Extravagant
campaigning is not new to American politics. In 1757, George Washington was
criticized for spending too much money in his campaign for the Virginia House of
Burgesses. According to his critics, Washington passed out twenty-eight gallons of
rum, fifty gallons of rum punch, thirty-four gallons of wine, forty-six gallons of
beer and two gallons of cider royal. Considering that only 391 voters resided in the
district, this amounted to over a quart-and-a half of liquor per voter. Alan Skelly,
Note, Political Action Committees and the Supreme Court, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV.281,
281 (1984) (citing J. HARRIGAN,POLITICSAND THE AMERICAN
FUTURE 213 (1984)).
9.
THE 1988 ELECTION
HERBERTE. ALEXANDER & MONICABAUER,FINANCING
1 (1991). At this point it is both interesting and customary to consider how many
miles 2.7 billion dollar bills placed end to end would extend. Considering that a
dollar bill is 6 inches in length, simple mathematics reveal that 2.7 billion dollars
multiplied by 6 inches per dollar divided by 12 inches times the reciprocal of 5,280
feet per mile yields 255,682 miles. This mileage could span the entire distance
from the earth to the moon or could be wrapped around the earth's equator ten
times. Oddly, however, the mileage only accounts for one-half of one percent of
John Sununu's frequent flyer miles.
Of course, if American "'[flinance [is] the art of passing currency from hand
10.
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elected" but that each year they need more and more money
to get elected.12 From 1972 t o 1988, for example, Senate
campaign spending increased over 600 percent while House
campaign spending increased over 456 percent.13 As a result,
this rate of spending increase has some candidates
worried--especially those who aren't very good at raising
money. The natural question to ask at this point is, "Who cares
if some candidates can't keep up with current spending levels?"
It's a "natural" question because in nature the weak are
doomed to die for the good of the group. Fortunately for the
weaker candidates, only people like economists and biologists
with very little political clout, and even less charisma, take
such arguments seriously.
There may be some real reasons for concern about the
rising costs of campaigns. Some argue that fund-raising has
become a full-time job that distracts incumbent candidates
from their official duties.14 Others argue that the candidates'
insatiable appetite for cash makes them dangerously dependent
upon political action committees (PACs) and other big
~ontributors.'~
Of course, most politicians don't want to buddy
up t o PACs just for their money-but they don't know how else
to get it?
Many, however, are quick to defend current spending
levels." Some contend that campaign spending promotes

to hand until it finally disappears,'" Thoughts on the Business of Life, FORBES,
Apr.
1, 1991, at 154 (quoting Robert W. Sarnoff), then maybe the system is working
just fine and you should quit reading.
11. Besides, it's not easy creating an image of electability, particularly if the
candidate is lacking in substantive qualifications.
12. It seems that political campaigns involve more and more image building
and less and less substance. See supra note 11.
13. MAGLEBY
& NELSON,supra note 8, at 28.
14. See MAGLEBY& NELSON,supra note 8, at 44-46. I personally don't see any
cause for concern. There may be good reasons to distract our elected officials from
their duties. The more they are distracted by spending their own money, the less
time they will have to spend ours.
15. Id. at 75-80.
16. Consider the words of presidential candidate Tom Harkin when asked about
PAC money: "I take PAC. money, you bet I do, . . . I don't want to fight with
one hand tied behind my back. In George Bush, we are up against the mother of
all money machines." Elizabeth Kolbert, Harkin Seeks to Recall Democrats' History,
Though Some Fear It, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 26, 1991, at D11.
17. See generally MAGLEBY
& NELSON,supm note 8, at 40-43. These tend to be
candidates who can, by the way, raise vast sums of money with relative ease. Such
candidates don't mind the Darwinian approach to campaign spending-it always
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participation in the political process by increasing voter
awareness of critical issue^.'^ Others actually have the
audacity to suggest that we really don't spend that much on
political campaigns. I think Senator Packwood made the point
very nicely:
We don't come near spending what we do in this country on
toothpaste or lipstick or beer or pet food or even advertising
for pet food. So, in terms of priorities and importance, let us
not get things out of scale. I would like to think that the
value of an election for Congress or the Senate is worth as
much as a can of cat food or dog food[!llg

Actually, the candidates' desperation for cash really isn't
their fault. We have given them every incentive t o behave
irrationally,20i.e., spend more on campaigns than they should.
A simple example of how one might go about auctioning a
single U.S. dollar for more than it is worth will help illustrate
In the
the quandary in which candidates find them~elves.~'
dollar auction, two participants bid for a dollar with the
restriction that both the winner and loser must pay their bids.
The structure of the auction creates a trap for both players
when the bidding reaches ninety-nine cents. By bidding one
cent more, the next bidder would just break even while the
second bidder would lose ninety-nine cents unless she stays in
the game. By bidding $1.01, the second bidder can cut her
losses from ninety-nine cents to one cent. The bidding
continues in this fashion as each bidder bids more and more in
an effort to minimize losses. Theoretically, the auction ends
when one player runs out of money. Campaign dynamics bear a
strong resemblance to the dollar auction in that all candidates,

helps to be at the top of the food chain.
18. Id. at 41-42 (citing 133 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1987)
(Statement of Sen. Dole)). I wonder, however, if spending increases voter
participation as much as it increases voter annoyance.
19.
133 CONG. REC. S7548 (daily ed. June 3, 1987) (Statement of Sen.
Packwood). Cf. Old Proverb, "Putting your best foot forward at least keeps it out of
your mouth."
20.
Astute obsewation suggests that they needed no coaxing in the frrst place.
21.
See Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative
Behavior and Escalation, 15 J . CONFLICTRESOL.109-11 (1971). It is a novel idea,
but one that is not well received among economists. For decades, economists have
been trying to convince us that markets behave rationally, and then Shubik comes
along and gives us good reasons to doubt rational market theories.

4931

CAMPAIGN FINANCE & SHERWOOD FOREST

497

win or lose, are required to pay their "bids" (campaign
expenses). Accordingly, we should show a little compassion for
candidates who find themselves in the middle of a n
uncontrollable spending frenzy.
111. ASSESSINGVARIOUSCAMPAIGN
REFORMPROPOSALS:
FROMBRAINSTORM
TO THE ABSURD

Given these problems with our campaign finance system,
should we throw up our hands,22 convinced that nothing can
be done? Or can we "refine'a3 our elections and avoid the
expense of all this campaigning? One might first be tempted to
try a military coup. A military dictatorship would certainly
eliminate unnecessary campaign expenses, but would have the
rather extreme effect of eliminating campaigns all together.
"Not a bad idea," you might say, until you remember that the
people a t the Pentagon also have a lousy track record of
spending.24
With hopes dashed for a quick military solution, we are left
to consider other alternatives. Why not try "democracy by
chance"? For example, each state could hold its own "Seat in
Congress Lotto." Think about it: each candidate would pay
$1.00 to play the regular Lotto and could then throw away a n
extra $1.00 on power play. The beauty of the system is that it
limits spending to $2.00 per candidate and it's fair because
each candidate has the same one-zillionth chance of
winning.25 'Who would run for office in this way?" you query.
Certainly a lot of people would play the campaign lotto once
they realized they could win a n all-expenses-paid shopping
spree in the nation's capital for a term of two or six years.
If you think the two preceding ideas sound silly, consider
two proposals that have been kicked around Washington lately.
First, some26have argued that we should "publicly f i n a n ~ e ' ~ '

22.
Or, just plain "throw up."
23.
Using the word loosely.
24.
Remember, e.g., $435 hammers, $640 toilet seats, etc.; see also Eric Schmitt,
No $435 Hammers, But Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1990, at A16.
25.
There would be no need to impose term Limitations. What are the odds of
the same candidate winning two campaign lottos in a row?
26.
Remember the candidates at the bottom of the food chain? You guessed it.
These are the "some" behind this proposal.
27.
This is congressional code language for "spend tax dollars."
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all federal campaigns.28 This means that each candidate
would receive a campaign stipend from the government each
election year. Sounds great until you consider that Uncle Sam
is in debt up to the stripes on his hat and really can't spare the
change. "No! No!'' exclaim the proponents of public funding, the
money can be raised from an "income tax check
that
would allow individuals to contribute a dollar or two3' to the
campaign kitty.31 The biggest problem with this idea is that it
would give our elected officials too much free time to think of
new ways to spend "public funds."32
The second reform proposal includes a system of spending
limitation^.^' Spending limits offer the most direct solution to
the dollar auction quandary.34 But consider the hardship that
spending limits would impose upon the candidates. Once a
candidate reached his spending quota, he would have to waste
a lot of extra time and energy trying to figure out alternative
ways to "spend more" without "spending more rn~ney."'~I'm
not suggesting that candidates would do anything illegalP6
but I am suggesting that politicians are creative people and
that we shouldn't discount their resourcefulness. Consider the
effectiveness of "soft money"" in whittling away individual
contribution limitations. Though the law limits the amount
that individuals may contribute to any single candidate, these
same individuals may make unlimited contributions of "soft
money" to the candidate's party for activities that indirectly
benefit the candidate.38
Spending limits also suffer another minor defect-they're

See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON,supra note 8, at 153-62.
29. This is like making a contribution with a gun to your head. What they are
saying is, "Since I already have your wallet in hand, how do you feel about
making a donation?"
30. Why don't they ask us to send in our old aluminum cans and cereal-box
tops while we are a t it?
31. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON,supra note 8, at 158-60.
32. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
33. See generally MAGLEBY& NELSON,supra note 8, at 162-75.
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35. Of course, this might create a nice distraction tying up several hundred
hours of a politician's time in any given year. See supra note 14 and accompanying
28.

text.

36. Far be it from me to suggest such an outrageous idea.
37. "Soft money" is money that has been slobbered on by the dog "under the
table."
38. See generally MAGLEBY& NELSON,supra note 8, at 19 & 166.
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unconstitutional! In Buckley v. Valeo,sS the Supreme Court
held that campaign spending is a form of speech protected by
the First Amendment and cannot be involuntarily limited.40
Now you know why "talk is cheap" unless politicians are the
people doing it.

Actually, public financiers and spending limitators [sicI4'
each make some valid points in favor of their respective
proposals. But both groups have been unable to convince
enough people that their ideas hold water.42 What we really
need is a political hero who can come to the rescue and propose
a compromise, a win-win solution. Since people like Madison
and Washington are no longer with
who could do a
better job than our childhood hero, Robin Hood?44 After all,
Robin Hood stands for everything we hold sacred today i n
American politics-you know-"Take from the rich and give to
the poor!"
Let's take a closer look at what this compromise might
entail. Our dollar auction example aptly demonstrated that we
shouldn't expect candidates to voluntarily limit their own
spending impulses. They need some external help.45 Outright
spending limitations also have some minor drawbacks and are
probably not the best way to go about controlling campaign
spending. The answer may lie in a system of negative

39.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
40.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
This is a short-hand way of saying, "I meant to do that."
41.
42.
A similar drawback is that these ideas really don't hold water.
This is not to say that we shouldn't look for modern day Madisons and
43.
Washingtons. However, as Stanley Cloud suggests, we may not want to waste our
time wandering the halls of Congress: "[Olnly a fool would expect 535 individual
politicians to coalesce into a body capable of national leadership. That is, after all,
what Presidents are for." Stanley W. Cloud, Bums of the Year, TIME,Jan. 6, 1992,
at 48.
44.
I bring Robin Hood into this Comment ignoring the fad that nobody can
agree upon whether he was real or fiction and further ignoring the fact that if he
was real, he would have been a foreigner. But hey, if the Framers could look
admiringly to foreigners like Locke, Montesquieu, and Hobbes, why shouldn't we at
least give a guy like Robin Hood a few paragraphs in a student comment included
in a Humor & the Law symposium?
A€ter all, these are the same people responsible for thousands of broken
45.
campaign promises.
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incentives that induce candidates to voluntarily limit their
campaign spending sprees. The next few paragraphs get a little
confusing, but, if you have ever successfully completed your
own Form 1040 before the April 15 deadline, you really
shouldn't have any d i f f i ~ u l t y . ~ ~
Figure 1 is a drawing of a typical candidate47in graphic
form.48 The graph represents the candidate's budget
constraint4' that plots campaign receipts on the vertical axis
and time on the horizontal axis.
Campaign
Receipts

I

A

-

Other Activities
0

C

B

-

Time

Fund Raising

Figure 1. The Candidate's Budget Constraint.

46.
Some of you might be saying, "I don't do my own taxes. I have my
accountant do them for me." If so, you should have your accountant read the next
few paragraphs.
47.
Notice the resemblance?
48.
Whatever you do, don't be impressed with graphs. Graphs are merely
evidence of the slow evolution of economic literature. They are the functional
equivalent of Neanderthal pictographs drawn on cave walls.
49.
Despite the fad that once these people get eleded they spend "public
funds" as if' there were no such thing as budget constraints, garden variety
candidates really are like you and me in that they have a tough time spending
more than their budget allows.

0
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Time is considered a fixed resource; therefore, line segment
AB represents the total amount of time available to the
candidate for all activities. Figure 1 assumes that candidates
trade time for campaign receipt^.^' Thus, at point B, the
candidate has spent no time fund-raising and her campaign
receipts equal zero. At point C, the candidate has spent time in
the amount of CB fund-raising, leaving time in the amount of
AC for all other acti~ities.~'
At point C, the candidate has
campaign receipts in the amount of R,. Now, how can we tell
exactly how much time the candidate will spend fund-raising?
The answer to that question depends on the candidate's own
set of preferences.
Campaign
Receipts

I

0

1

Other Activities

2

Time
Fund Raising

Figure 2. The Candidate's Indifference Curves.
50.
Never mind the fact that, in the past, some candidates have actually been
willing to trade political favors for campaign contributions. This is an economic
argument, and I am, therefore, allowed to ignore reality to make my point.
51. This graph is a bit tricky to read. The difficulty lies in the fact that to
determine how much time the candidate devotes to fund raising, you must read
the horizontal axis from right to left. To determine how much time the candidate
devotes to all activities excluding fund raising, you must read the horizontal axis
from left to right. If this explanation hasn't helped, try reading the graph while
relaxing in a soothing bubble bath. That way, if you never do catch on to the
graph, youll at least have one thing to thank me for.
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Figure 2 represents the candidate's trade-off between
campaign receipts and other activities. The curved lines labeled
I, and I, are called "indifference curves."62 The curves
represent constant levels of satisfaction. In other words, as far
as the candidate is concerned, any point on a given curve is
just as desirable as another point along that same curve. The
levels of satisfaction increase in a "north easterly" direction on
the graph.
In Figure 2, the candidate maximizes her fund-raising
satisfactions3 at point A where I, is tangent to her budget
constraint. At point A, the candidate spends time fund-raising
in an amount represented by the distance from T,* to T3, and
receives campaign contributions in the amount of R*. At any
other level of fund-raising, the candidate would fall on a lower
indifference curve-a less desirable result. For example, at
point B, the candidate receives greater contributions, %, but
has less time t o devote to other activities like recovering from
the lead-weight pancakes she consumed at early morning fundraising breakfasts.

52. There is really nothing sacred about the name "indifference curve." The
name probably owes its origin to the fact that economists are people who generally
lack a great deal of personality and creativity and who in a fit of rational boredom
settled upon the name "indifference."
53.
This is not to say that she maximizes her fund-raising income. "Income"
and 'satisfaction from income" are really two different things. Congress' recent
salary increase is a good example of how little satisfaction politicians derive fmm
any income less than $125,000.
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Campaign
Receipts
R

Tax
Amount

Time
Other Activities

Fund Raising

Figure 3. The Effect of a Negative Incentive Tax.

Figure 3 depicts what happens to our candidate's fundraising activities when she is subjected t o a negative
incentive-a tax on gross campaign receipts. The tax creates a
new budget constraint represented by the dotted line lying just
below the solid budget constraint. The shift in the budget
constraint compels the candidate to operate on a lower
indifference curve. Notice that campaign receipts fall from Rot o
R, and fund-raising time decreases from To t o TI. The
advantage of the negative incentive tax is that it is not an
absolute ceiling on spending and does not require a political
determination of how much total spending is too much.s4
Instead, campaign fund-raising activities and spending are

54.
This prevents pitting more perfectly evolved candidates at the top of the
food chain directly against weaker candidates at the bottom of the chain when
trying to decide exactly where a given spending limit should be drawn.
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voluntarily curtailed when subjected to the negative
incentive.55
'Well enough," say the spending limitators, "the idea at
least partially satisfies our desire to cap spending." But now we
hear the public financiers ask, 'What's in the proposal for us?"
Actually there is something in the proposal that might help the
public financiers get a little extra sleep at night. Look at
Figure 3 again.56Remarkably, the negative incentive tax has
extracted a net revenue from our beleaguered candidate of R,
&. If you are a public financier, you are now probably starting
to wake up from the slumber induced by the preceding
paragraphs. Reaching for your calculator, you start to
wonder:7 ' m a t if that $718 million spent by individual
candidates in the 1988 federal campaign had been subject to a
15 percent tax?" Happily, you discover that the 1988 campaign
would have generated revenues in excess of $107 million.
Remembering that generating revenues is only half the fun, we
ask, "What should we do with all that money?" Returning to
the gospel of modern American politics and drawing upon the
lessons from Nottingham, we realize that the $107 million was
taken from none other than "rich candidates." So why not take
that pot of gold and give it to "poor candidate^?"^^ "Hooray!"

-

On a more serious note, the negative incentive could be enhanced by a
55.
graduated rate of taxation that would result in greater campaign receipts being
subject to increasing rates of taxation. In such an environment, large contributors
would probably alter their own donation strategies. If a contributor knew that its
target candidate was nearing a greater tax bracket, it would realize that a
substantial portion of its donation would not end up in the candidate's pocket. To
avoid diluting its contribution, the contributor could be expected to spread its
wealth among several candidates who have not yet reached top level tax brackets.
56.
"Agony!" you cry out when you fmally realize that I am asking you to look
at Figure 3 "again." I apologize. I realize that one look at a graph is about all any
self-respecting non-economist can stomach, but if you will bear with me, I promise
that there will only be one more graph to look at after this.
57.
Don't bother reaching for your calculator, I'll do the math for you. Rest
assured. You can trust my calculations. ARer all, I am a product of public
education.
58.
Of course, somebody will still need to decide who the "poor candidates" are.
The decision could be avoided, however, by one of two means. First, treat
everybody the same. You heard me. This is America and we at least have to give
lip service to equality. Thus, the revenues would be divided equally among all
nominees; part of the amount paid to the big fund raisers will return in the form
of the negative incentive tax. Second, if you are still clinging to the law of the
jungle argument made earlier in this Comment, don't give the money to anybody
and let the little candidates fall by the wayside. Instead, use the money for some
silly thing like paying off the national debt.
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exclaim the public financiers as they realize that they will now
be entitled t o a substantial election year windfall.
Campaign
Receipts
R

T

Other Activities

0

T

1

Time
Fund Raising

-0
0
Figure 4. Effect of an Assistance Payment to the Candidate.

Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of a common fund
assistance payment to a single needy candidate. The amount of
the assistance payment is represented by the horizontal line
EC and insures the candidate a minimum budget in the
amount of R'. The candidate's original budget constraint AB is
now modified by the lump sum payment and is represented by
the line ACB. Before the lump sum payment, the candidate
spent To time fund-raising and received contributions in the
amount of %. ARer the payment, the candidate spends time in
the amount of T, devoted to fund-raising but now has total
contributions R, at her disposal to compete with more perfectly
evolved candidates up the food chain.

Well, perhaps this Comment hasn't discussed all of the
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intricacies of campaign f i n a n ~ e . ~ But,
'
a t least it has
attempted to present a workable compromise between the
public financiers and the spending limitators. The negative
incentive based campaign finance proposal tries to satisfy the
spending limitator's impulse to curb run away-campaign costs
and correct the dollar auction problem of the current system.
The proposal also attempts to give the public financiers a little
working capital with which to work their social justice and help
out feeble candidates.
If you are a spending limitator and happen to share an
office with a public financier, this Comment will hopefully give
you both some common ground upon which to build a
somewhat civil relationship. But before you both go in together
on that houseboat time-share, don't forget about the more
perfectly evolved candidates on the other end of the food chain.
They are likely to impede your budding relationship because
they neither need nor want real reform. Be patient. Their time
will come. For, as our hero Robin Hood said, "'He who is fat
from overliving must needs lose blood.' '"O

York Moody Faulkner

59.
To do so would require an entire book. Besides, the publishing companies I
know of aren't likely to give a third year law student a cash advance to write a
voluminous exposition on a bunch of theoretical hogwash. That's what professors
are for.
60.
PYLE,supra note 1, at 101 (Robin Hood quoting Gaffer Swanthold).

